Abstract. According to UNHCR, around 12 million people still continue to be denied the right to nationality, and the persistence of "legal ghosts" is likely to be the case on the long run. The article aims at drawing a picture on the legal status and protection of stateless persons, granted principally by public international law and partly, indirectly the law of the European Union. It sheds light to the rather sporadic but noteworthy developments in international law after the adoption of the 1954 New York Convention, then examines the added value of the EU legal order, even if the Community legislator only treated the stateless in an indirect manner. It concludes that the EU law is an extra but thin layer on the international legal framework protecting stateless persons; thus the EU should make steps, using the new legal basis in the Treaty of Lisbon, so as to strengthen the status of these "legal ghosts".
I. Introduction to the world of "legal ghosts"
According to UNHCR estimations, 12 million people 1 still continue to be denied the right to nationality, and the persistence of "legal ghosts" is likely to be the case even on the long run. This paper aims at drawing a picture on the legal status of stateless persons, granted principally by public international law and partly, indirectly the law of the European Union (EU). The signifi cance of this topic stems from the fact that as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the state successions in Central-Eastern Europe during the '90s, lots of persons having no nationality arrived in the EU from the ex-Yugoslav countries or from the Commonwealth of Independent States, both to the "old" and the newly acceded Member States. Moreover, with the 2004 enlargement, countries having considerable number of stateless persons residing on their territory (e.g. Baltic States) became Member States of the Union. Europe is one of the regions being highly affected by this phenomenon, since around 640 thousand stateless individuals live on the old continent.
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II. Responses of the international community to tackle statelessness
In public international law, after the creation of the United Nations (1945), two parallel approaches have been formulated to tackle this negative phenomenon. The fi rst focuses on identifying the magnitude of the problem; preventing statelessness pro futuro and reducing the existing number of stateless persons as much as possible. This attempt is marked principally by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 3 on the universal level; and with some other not so comprehensive treaties on the regional (European) level. 4 This specifi c legal framework is embedded in the general human rights law and completed by provisions relating to the right to nationality. 5 Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, it is a matter of fact that the number of stateless persons will never reach zero. Therefore a new, autonomous legal status has been created by virtue of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 6 aiming at providing an appropriate standard of international protection, a status comparable to other forms of international protection such as refugee status. In today's international law, it is still the 1954 New York Convention alone, almost sixty years later, under which stateless people enjoy specifi c international legal protection, containing the basic rules and rights determining their legal status.
III. Scope and content of the 1954 New York Convention: an overview
As for its scope ratione personae, the relating to the Status of Refugees 7 ) and its defi nition strictly covers the so-called de iure stateless persons. 8 The International Law Commission (ILC) has observed that the defi nition in Article 1(1) is now part of customary international law. 9 It should be noted however, that not all stateless persons falling under the defi nition of Article 1(1) are entitled to benefi t from this protection regime. According to the exclusion clause, the Convention shall not apply to a) persons receiving from UN agencies other than the UNHCR (e.g. UNRWA) protection or assistance so long as they are receiving it; b) persons recognized by the competent authorities of the country of residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country; and c) persons having committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity or a serious non-political crime outside the country of their residence prior to their admission to that country or having been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.
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The set of rights provided for in the Convention is similar to those in the 1951 Geneva Convention. Some 30 provisions of the Convention set out a minimum standard of treatment for the stateless, without discrimination, beyond which States are free to extend additional protection and rights to them.
11 Three different levels of protection are established: fi rst, treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to aliens generally, secondly, treatment on a par with nationals; thirdly, the absolute rights which are not contingent upon the treatment of any other group, but guaranteed directly. 12 The main absolute rights are identity papers grounds of national security or public order, and such an expulsion shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law.
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The international protection regime of stateless persons cannot be compared with international refugee law where apart the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR ExCom and other judicial and non-judicial bodies developed and detailed the conventional rules, interpreted on several occasion the meaning of different concepts such as the nonrefoulement etc. International refugee law has been constantly evolving since its creation, while the only one international instrument on the protection of the stateless is the 1954 New York Convention; and we cannot witness such a rich documentation, soft law and jurisprudence in this fi eld either. Another weakness of the system is that the 1954 New York Convention is, by substance, not a self-executing treaty; States have to adopt domestic implementing legislation to make it effective. Moreover, the Convention does not contain provisions on the statelessness determination procedure either (it is up to the individual States to establish such legal channels), which gap makes claiming those rights more diffi cult if one cannot offi cially obtain that status. To sum up, statelessness law has almost been forgotten for long decades.
IV. Subsequent developments of the protection regime
1. In spite of the above, progressive developments on specifi c issues, rather sporadically, are enshrined in certain instruments. Going through these thematically, the progress made in the fi eld of consular and diplomatic protection of stateless persons is worth attention. Our starting point is the Schedule to Article 28 of the 1954 Convention, which declares that the delivery of travel document "does not in any way entitle the holder to the protection of the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country of issue, and does not ipso facto confer on these authorities a right to protection. ratifi cations. 17 This right is therefore not a treaty law in force, but still shows the tendencies of legal developments.
One had to wait a couple of decades until the issue of protecting stateless persons abroad has been put again on the international law-making agenda, this time on the universal level (within the UN system). The ILC included the topic of diplomatic protection into its agenda in 1995 18 and adopted the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006, endorsed also by the UN General Assembly. 19 As draft article 1 is defi nitional by nature it does not mention stateless persons. Article 3 does, however, make it clear that diplomatic protection may be exercised in respect of such persons.
20 Draft Article 3(2) opens the door generally for certain categories of persons not being nationals of the State concerned, 21 including stateless persons. This is explicitly expressed in draft Article 8 which relates to stateless persons and refugees. By virtue of paragraph 1 of this article, A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person who, at the date of injury and at the date of the offi cial presentation of the claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that State. This is clearly an attempt for progressive development of international law, because traditionally the general rule was that a State might exercise diplomatic protection only on behalf of its nationals. This is well illustrated in the Dickson Car Wheel Company v. United Mexican States case (1931) when the United States-Mexican Claims Commission held that a stateless person could not be the benefi ciary of diplomatic protection: "[a] State … does not commit an international delinquency in infl icting an injury upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently, no State is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf either before or after the injury". 22 As the ILC found, this dictum no longer refl ects the accurate position of international law for stateless persons. Contemporary international law refl ects a concern for the status of this category of persons, evidenced by specifi c conventions on statelessness. 23 In line with these efforts, according to draft article 8(1), a State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person, regardless of how he/she became stateless, provided that the person was lawfully and habitually resident in that State both at the time of injury and at the date of the offi cial presentation of the claim. The requirement of both lawful residence and habitual residence sets a high threshold, notions 17 As of 10 July, 4 States have ratifi ed it and an additional 5 States have signed it without ratifying yet (source: http://conventions.coe.int).
18 First, a Working Group was created dealing with this topic in 1995. Then, in 1998 after two reports of the Working Group, a special rapporteur was designated who prepared several; interim reports on the subject. Finally, The Commission subsequently adopted the draft articles on Diplomatic Protection on second reading as well as decided to recommend to the General Assembly the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles. 19 borrowed from the 1997 European Convention on Nationality 24 Habitual residence in this context is intended to convey continuous residence. Although this threshold is high and may lead to a lack of effective protection for some individuals, the combination of lawful residence and habitual residence is, as pointed out by the ILC in the Commentaries, justifi ed in the case of an exceptional measure introduced de lege ferenda, 25 since States are more likely to accept such a new rule if enlarging the scope ratione personae of diplomatic protection is not without limitations and conditions. I also draw attention to the temporal requirement for the bringing of a claim: the stateless person must be a lawful and habitual resident of the claimant State both at the time of the injury and at the date of the offi cial presentation of the claim, even if quite a long time has already elapsed between the two acts. Finally, it is to be noted that the "may clause" contained in draft Article 8(1) emphasizes the discretionary nature of the right. In other words, it is not an obligation of States, but an option to include legally and habitually residing stateless individuals into the sphere of diplomatic protection, but States have discretion whether to extend such protection to a stateless person.
By concluding, it can be stated that consular protection and diplomatic protection operate as additional elements of their protection in abroad, even if these rules have not become legally binding yet, but clearly indicate the developments and the will of the international community to move forward.
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As for other domains or set of rights having been extended to de iure stateless human beings by international treaties, the page is blank except intellectual property rights. From a human rights perspective, the right to intellectual property forms an element of a cluster of rights broadly referred to as "cultural rights". For the stateless, a cultural identity distinct from that of the majority of the population is often a contributing factor to their plight; similarly diffi culties enjoying that distinct cultural life are not uncommon. 27 which assimilated stateless persons having habitual residence in a State Party to the nationals of that State (paragraph 1). By doing so, this Protocol builds upon the provisions of the 1954 New York Convention. Article 14 of the latter sets forth the rights concerning artistic rights (which is a synonym for copyright) and industrial property, stating that stateless persons shall be accorded in the country in which they have the habitual residence the same protection as it accorded to nationals of that country. However, they also enjoy protection in any other Contracting Party: they shall be accorded the same protection as provided for the nationals of their country of habitual residence in the territory of that Contracting Party. It can be seen that Protocol No. 1 determines the same level of protection (stateless persons are on equal footing with nationals) and the same condition for benefi ting from this right (habitual residence in a Contracting Party). The purpose of these rules is to provide protection of the "totality of creations of the human mind". 28 Although the 1954 24 Article 6(4), point (g), where they are used in connection with the acquisition of nationality. and without the requirement of residence. It prescribes equal treatment between nationals and stateless persons in different branches of social security (medical care; sickness benefi t; maternity benefi t; invalidity benefi t; old-age benefi t; survivors' benefi t; employment injury benefi t; unemployment benefi t; and family benefi t). However, the scope of the obligations varies from State to State, since "each Member shall specify in its ratifi cation in respect of which branch or branches of social security it accepts the obligations of this Convention".
As a similar regional international instrument, the 1972 European Convention on Social Security
34 is worth mentioning shortly. After the European Interim Agreements on Social Security done in 1953 under the aegis of the Council of Europe (CoE), the CoE Member States left open the possibility of extending the Agreements to give non-nationals and migrants more complete and effective protection. Thus in 1959, it was decided to draft a multilateral convention to co-ordinate the social security legislations of the CoE member States. 35 The Convention, using the 1954 New York Convention defi nition of "stateless person", covers stateless persons resident in the territory of a Contracting Party 36 who have been subject to the legislation of the Contracting Parties, together with the members of their families and their survivors. It affi rms the principle of equality of treatment with nationals in the fi elds of application of the Convention, such as general and special schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, including employers' liability schemes providing benefi ts. This instrument can be considered as building upon, between a limited number of States in Some jurisprudence has also been developed concerning the intra-Community status of the stateless in this respect. In the Khalil and others case 42 the plaintiffs were Palestinians from Lebanon who, in fl ight from the civil war in the Lebanon, had arrived in Germany in the middle of the '80s where they have since lived continuously. Under German law, they were regarded as stateless persons. Since those persons had the grant of child benefi t discontinued under new German legislation during the period from December 1993 to March 1994, they submitted in support of their actions challenging the decisions depriving them of those advantages that they and/or their spouses had to be regarded as stateless persons. Consequently they should enjoy family benefi ts in accordance with Community law, which would enable them to be treated in the same way as German nationals or other nationals of the EU Member States. According to them, payment of those benefi ts should not have been made conditional on possession of a specifi c residence document.
The ECJ pointed out in its judgment in 2001 that, in 1957, the original six Member States were all contracting parties to the 1954 New York Convention. The Court also found that the Council cannot be criticized for having included stateless persons resident on the territory of the Member States, even though those persons do not enjoy the right of freedom of movement according to the EC Treaty, within the scope of the Community regulation on social security for migrant workers and their families. The Council did so in order to take into account the international obligations of all the Member States. The inclusion of this category into the Regulation simply refl ected international obligations already undertaken (both at the level of the United Nations and within the Council of Europe 43 ). Furthermore, coordination excluding stateless persons … would have meant that the Member States, in order to ensure compliance with their international obligations, had to establish a second coordination regime designed solely for that very restricted category of persons. 44 As a result of those international obligations, national law already assimilated stateless persons to nationals for social security purposes, whereas the treatment of foreign nationals depended upon reciprocity or bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements. As the Advocate General argued, in Europe of the 1950s, grappling with the aftermath of the Second World War, it was undoubtedly felt that it would be politically and morally unacceptable for one of the very fi rst regulations adopted by the fl edgling European Economic Community to exclude a category of persons who had been expressly included in and protected by the earlier agreements and conventions binding on the original Member States. 45 Another question was to decide whether stateless persons may rely on the rights conferred by the Community regulation where they have travelled to that Member State directly from a third-country and have not moved within the Community. The Court held that the objective of Community law in respect of migrant workers is coordinating the social security schemes of the Member States and payment of benefi ts under those coordinated schemes. Regulation No. 1408/71/EC lays down a whole set of rules founded upon the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality or residence and upon the maintenance by a worker of his rights acquired by virtue of one or more social security schemes which are or have been applicable to him. The Court referred to its earlier caselaw according to which those rules do not apply to situations which have no factor linking them to Community law. The advantages derived from the status of migrant worker within the European Union cannot be granted to stateless persons residing in a Member State where they are in a situation which is confi ned in all respects within that one Member State. 46 In other words, the "external element" (élément d'extranéité) required for EU citizens to benefi t from the rights granted by Community law is also a precondition for stateless persons: without moving form a Member State to another, they are in a purely internal situation where EC law does not come into play. It is an innovative element in these rules on visa-free travel that they cover all stateless persons, both those under the 1954 New York Convention and those outside of the scope of that Convention. 50 For example, non-citizens of Latvia are given a special passport (not the one according to the 1954 New York Convention) which not only grants them the constitutional right to belong to the State, but it has also been recognised by the EU as valid for visa-free travel. 51 This is thus the fi rst time in EU legislation where a larger personal scope (including eventually the de facto stateless as well) applies than that defi ned in the 1954 New York Convention.
4.
Nevertheless, despite all these developments, provisions of European Union law only lay down sporadic rules; a well-developed European system as in case of refugees (benefi ciaries of subsidiary protection) does not exist with regard to stateless persons. The Community legislator should put more emphasis on their legal protection. Just to mention an example: the majority of the Member States do not have specifi c procedures governing the recognition of stateless status (exceptions are Spain or Hungary), which shortage was highlighted by UNHCR as well. 52 As a result, it is impossible to determine the magnitude of this problem within the EU. Knowing the fact the 1954 Convention does not provide a comprehensive regulation (old treaty-new challenges, lack of detailed rules, no procedural rules), the EU should make steps with a view to strengthening the status of these "legal ghosts".
The most progressive EU institution in this regard, the European Parliament has already started raising awareness and putting this issue on the higher political agenda. In the summer of 2007, it organised a seminar on issues relating to statelessness, 53 then in 2009, the EP passed a non-legislative resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , 54 which devoted a paragraph for the stateless as well. These recommendations call on the Member States concerned "to ratify the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), and on the reduction of statelessness (1961)" as well as call on "those Member States which gained or regained sovereignty in the 1990s to treat all persons previously resident in their territory without any discrimination, and [call] on them to systematically bring about just solutions, based on the recommendations of international organisations, to the problems encountered by all victims of discriminatory practices"; and fi nally "condemns, in particular, practices of deliberate erasure of registered permanent residents within the European Union and [call] on the governments concerned to take effective measures to restore the status of those stateless persons". 55 These recommendations are, however, not urging the setting up of the EU-level framework for the protection of stateless people, but highlight the importance of undertaking the relevant international obligations by all Member States. 56 It is not surprising, since there was no legal basis in the founding Treaties, even after the Treaty of Amsterdam, for adopting such specifi c secondary legislation, exclusively focusing on the protection of the stateless. The existing rules protect stateless in an indirect way, where the legal basis is linked to a fundamental freedom (freedom of movement of workers; their social security) or other EC policy (entry and stay of third country nationals). As a consequence, this category of people has been covered as a result of side effects of the legislation.
Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon opened a new era, since it explicitly refers, for the fi rst time in the primary law, to stateless persons, which can be a basis for further developments. Article 67(2) TFEU stipulates that "[f]or the purpose of ... Title [V], stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals". It is promising that generally speaking they are on equal footing with the third-country nationals in the area of justice, freedom and security, and this will surely be refl ected in the personal scope of the new secondary EU legislation adopted under the provisions of Title V. We will see in the future how far the Union legislator will go on the basis of this treaty provision in order to provide an area of justice, freedom and security for this hardly visible group of human beings.
